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Keynes, the Neglected Theorist 
 
 
Notwithstanding Keynes’s reputation, very little of his magnum opus, The 
General Theory, has been received into modern economics. The investment-
saving identity is perhaps the only original concept which has been fully 
accepted into the canon and while his name is most closely associated with 
aggregate demand and the multiplier, neither of these really originated with 
Keynes (Laidler, 1999). Furthermore, ‘Keynesian’ economics was rightly 
criticised for its lack of explanation of its assumption of sticky prices, 
including wages. 
In this chapter, I will argue that Keynes’s theoretical contribution, 
neglected by followers and opponents alike, was to restate the Marshallian 
theory of value (based on competitive, flexible prices) in a form which took 
full account of the nature of time and incorporated the theory of money. 
Keynes showed that perfect competition could not deliver full employment 
and that sticky wages were the consequence, not the cause of this failure. In 
doing so, he introduced some highly original concepts, which still have not 
been fully appreciated and should be, if macroeconomics is ever to progress 
beyond the Classical orthodoxy to which it has currently reverted. This 
theoretical neglect has also limited the impact of Keynes on policy, notably 
in the areas of labour markets, the international monetary system and 
financial regulation. 
Underlying Keynes’s approach is an awareness that money plays no 
essential role in the Classical theory of value and that a proper treatment of a 
monetary economy (meaning any industrialised economy) requires a theory 
in which the nature of time and money are taken seriously. There are three 
key areas in which The General Theory offered new insights which require 
far-reaching change in economic theory and policy: the meaning of 
competitive equilibrium in a monetary economy, the central role and nature 
of expectation and the consequent meaning of liquidity. All of these insights 
have been unduly neglected, even by Post Keynesian theorists, and are now 
addressed in turn. 
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COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM IN A MONETARY 
ECONOMY 
Income in a productive market economy, characterised by a division of 
labour, is intrinsically monetary. Both output and capital are heterogeneous 
and it is an error to treat vectors of ‘incommensurable collections of 
miscellaneous objects’ as scalar variables: an index will not serve for causal 
analysis. Yet this is precisely the approach, not only of Classical, but also of 
most Post Keynesian macroeconomists. Despite Keynes devoting 38 pages 
(nearly 10% of The General Theory) to the problem of defining income and 
its relation to saving and investment (G.T. pp. 37–40, 52–85), Hansen states: 
‘The section on Income is of no great importance for an understanding of The 
General Theory and may quite well be omitted if the student so wishes.’ 
(Hansen, 1953, p. 54). Then he, and nearly everyone else since, proceeds to 
write Y for real income, without realising that they are thereby committed to a 
‘corn model’ in which, under perfect competition, involuntary unemployment 
is impossible. This is entirely different, of course, from deflating money-
income by the wage-unit as numeraire to give a measure of real income ‘in 
some sense’ (G.T. p. 91). 
If output were truly homogeneous, the central argument of The General 
Theory would fail. Keynes’s principal policy aim was to discredit the 
prescription of wage-cuts as a remedy for unemployment and his argument 
hinges on the distinction between money and real wages. If employers and 
workers bargain in real terms, e.g. over quantities of corn, there can be no 
denying that if workers are prepared to accept their marginal production of 
corn as their wage, they can all be profitably employed. The corn might pile 
up in the employers’ granaries rather than being eaten by landlords, but since 
there can be no difference between saving and investment, there can be no 
failure of Say’s Law.1 Keynes’s point is that employers and workers bargain 
in money terms and that, even under perfect competition, the real wage is not 
determined in the labour market. When output is heterogeneous, the real 
wage is not a causal variable, it is simply the resultant of the money-wage 
and an arbitrary index of product prices. 
Under what conditions might the assumption of homogeneous output be a 
harmless abstraction in a monetary economy? All firms would have to be 
producer co-operatives, in which labour was paid according to the sales value 
of its output. In a co-operative or self-employed economy, given competitive 
product markets, the exertion of labour to produce saleable output will 
generate revenue. If the product price is low, the revenue may not be worth 
the effort and leisure may be preferred. The difference between an economy 
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of self-employed households in perfect competition and Robinson Crusoe lies 
only in the division of labour. 
By contrast, what we observe in practice is the existence of a wage-
dependent labour force. Employment in this context means wage labour, the 
hire of labour for a sum of money, and not merely occupation or self-
employment. A theory of employment is then a theory of the decisions of 
employers to hire labour and of employees to offer their services. In a theory 
of self-employment, there is no hiring decision. The payment of a money-
wage under an employment contract brings money directly into the 
production process so that it becomes more than a medium of exchange for 
finished output. 
The General Theory does not consider the weighty question of why a 
wage-dependent labour force exists. For Keynes, the distinction between 
entrepreneurs (employers) and workers (employees) is essential, as in Marx, 
Marshall and Pigou, but not in Walrasian general equilibrium models. 
Entrepreneurs alone, and not workers, sell to product markets and decide 
what, and how, to produce. It is tempting to argue that the division between 
employers and workers is a consequence of uncertainty but Keynes does not 
claim this directly: aware, no doubt, that there are many other human, 
technical, social and political factors that consign most of us to the status of 
employees. 
In a ‘monetary production economy’ labour cannot insist on being 
employed, even if its marginal revenue product and real wage exceed the 
marginal disutility of that amount of employment (G.T. p. 291). 
Entrepreneurial firms exist, not to hire labour, but to make profit. By 
definition, wage-labour does not make the hiring decision, and the primary 
purpose of The General Theory is to explain how firms can find it 
unprofitable under competitive conditions to employ more labour, even 
though unemployed labour is for hire at the going rate. At the root of this 
problem is that both workers and employers are necessarily concerned with 
income, in the form of money wages and profits respectively. Neither 
workers nor shareholders can be paid in kind. 
This discussion of the nature of income has been necessary in order to 
address Keynes’s use of equilibrium analysis. In summary, Keynes’s 
definition of competitive equilibrium in terms of the choices of 
entrepreneurs, investors and consumers, which he calls the principle of 
effective demand, is radically different from the Classical concept of the 
preferred allocation of factor services. The owners of factors per se do not 
make hiring decisions. The principle of effective demand is therefore a 
concept of the equilibrium of industry as a whole which supersedes the 
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Classical full-employment equilibrium. Since the term ‘general equilibrium’ 
has become inextricably linked to the Classical concept, it may be better to 
use the term ‘system equilibrium’ as the still more general case, 
encompassing both Walrasian general equilibrium and Keynes’s equilibrium 
of industry as a whole, with or without full employment. 
Keynes’s concept of system equilibrium is superior to the Walrasian, 
partly because it reclaims the use of equilibrium analysis for the explanation 
of the level of employment at any time, whether or not there exists 
involuntary unemployment. The Walrasian concept is applicable only to full 
employment, and either involuntary unemployment must be denied (as in 
New Classical theory) or if unemployment is admitted (as in New Keynesian 
theory), it is a matter of disequilibrium or departure from full-employment 
equilibrium. The very concept of disequilibrium implies corrective forces 
working to restore equilibrium, if they are not impeded. Keynes, by contrast, 
offers a theory of employment as in equilibrium at any time, even if the 
position of equilibrium may change from day to day. 
Keynes’s formal device for expressing this is the employment function 
( )wDFN = , which relates the level of employment to the level of effective 
demand (expected money-income, expressed in wage-units). Any given level 
of aggregate employment may be associated with an indefinitely large 
number of distributions of employment across industries. This idea is 
captured by the concept of a production possibility surface, defined for any 
given set of factors of production including labour. For Keynes, there are 
many production frontiers nested inside one another, like electron shells, each 
representing all the possible distributions of employment that correspond to 
any given level of aggregate employment offered by entrepreneurs, while by 
contrast the Walrasian model considers only the full employment frontier. In 
Walrasian terms, the employment function introduces the preferences of 
households contingent upon any given level of income, thus picking out the 
point on the particular production possibility shell for any given level of 
employment that entrepreneurs expect to be preferred by consumers and 
investors: the point of effective demand. 
It is worth noting, as an important aside, that Keynes’s neglected 
employment function is the answer to Sraffa’s critique (1926) of the 
Marshallian theory of value and is the key to a Marshallian macroeconomics. 
Just as the Walrasian general equilibrium approach does not consider the 
distribution of output between individual firms but considers the production 
possibilities of the economy as a whole, so Keynes works ‘top down’ from 
the aggregate supply and demand functions of industry as a whole. Having 
established the point of aggregate effective demand, the distribution of 
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effective demand between industries and firms is then endogenous, based on 
the physical conditions of supply, consumer and worker preferences and (of 
course) aggregate income. An important implication (which has not generally 
been understood by the Post Keynesian school) is that Keynes’s construction 
depends on—not merely accommodates—perfect competition: imperfect 
competition cannot be introduced at the aggregate level without 
indeterminacy (G.T. p. 281). The degree of monopoly cannot be derived from 
the demand curve. The theory of monopolistic competition is necessarily an 
exercise in partial equilibrium analysis.2 
Thus both Keynes and the Walrasian school offer expressions of 
competitive system equilibrium in which preferences, technology and 
endowment combine to determine a set of prices and quantities. The 
difference is that in the Walrasian system the resource constraint is the 
endowment alone, while in Keynes’s, the endowment may not be fully 
employed: his system is over-determined, by an additional constraint in the 
form of the level of effective demand (Ambrosi, 2003). An important 
corollary is that in Keynes’s system, factor prices are not market-clearing 
prices, as are the prices of new goods. The money-wage and  the money-rents 
of land and other existing capital-goods: none of these are equilibrium prices 
in that sense. The Classical reader may be reluctant to accept Keynes’s 
definition of an equilibrium excluding factor markets, yet it is the inevitable 
consequence of involuntary unemployment: in the Classical system, factors 
in excess supply are free goods and their prices should drop to zero. Only if 
we are prepared to let go of the Classical concept of equilibrium, can we 
release equilibrium analysis to explain a monetary economy. 
It is interesting (revealing?) that the early Hicks refused to accept 
aggregate income as a causal variable, arguing that income is an unnecessary 
concept and that economic theory can do quite well without it (1939, p. 180). 
It is true that modern general equilibrium theory (unlike macroeconomic 
theory) has, at one level, accepted Keynes’s critique of the concept of 
homogeneous real income and manages to construct an equilibrium of 
heterogeneous prices and quantities without once referring to aggregate 
income. Yet our argument has shown that it can do so only by ignoring the 
possibility that effective demand may constrain the employment of the 
endowment; the use of effective demand requires the proper definition and 
recognition of money-income as a causal variable in a monetary economy.3 
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EXPECTATION 
The General Theory extends Classical competitive equilibrium analysis so as 
to incorporate money into the theory of value. This extension of Marshallian 
analysis falls into two main areas, the definition of system equilibrium 
appropriate to a monetary economy, and the understanding and treatment of 
time. Keynes takes time seriously, as a one-way, irreversible sequence of 
historical events, and recognises that decisions are always made in the 
present, based on the unchangeable past and the unknown future. It is time 
which gives money its ‘essential and peculiar’ character, and makes a 
monetary economy 
… one in which changing views about the future are capable of influencing the 
quantity of employment and not merely its direction. But our method of analysing 
the economic behaviour of the present under the influence of changing ideas about 
the future is one which depends on the interaction of demand and supply, and is in 
this way linked up with our fundamental theory of value. We are thus led to a more 
general theory, which includes the Classical theory with which we are familiar, as 
a special case. (G.T. p. xxii) 
The understanding of time as irreversible has profound implications for 
equilibrium analysis. If today’s decision to produce, consume or invest is to 
be described as an equilibrium outcome, the competitive forces bringing 
about this equilibrium must also act today, in the present. Past decisions and 
future outcomes are strictly irrelevant. 
For Marshall, the present corresponds to the market period, during which a 
given stock of finished goods and endowment of factor services are traded, 
and the supply and demand for the product of each industry are held in 
equilibrium by competition. However, most production takes time. The 
decision to employ labour or invest in a capital-good today depends on the 
market prices that are expected to rule in the future (the ‘expectations’), when 
the final output resulting from these decisions is finished and ready for sale.  
One formal Walrasian response to time is to postulate the existence of 
complete markets, so that the price of future finished output at any date and 
in any state of the world can be determined today by the balance of supply 
and demand. Under these strong conditions the future is reduced to the 
present, time disappears, and equilibrium remains a meaningful, but ideal, 
concept. No-one disputes that not all futures and insurance markets exist, so 
the real question is whether competitive equilibrium theory can explain any 
important aspect of the world as we find it.  
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In the absence of a forward contract, decisions must be made on the 
strength of an expectation, something which already plays an important part 
in Marshall’s system. Marshall’s market prices are qualitatively different 
from his Normal prices, the expectation of which in the short period induces 
firms to produce goods in a particular quantity, and in the long period induces 
investors to order new capital equipment. Marshall does not suggest that 
Normal prices as such are directly observable, but he does assume that 
competition tends to bring market prices into line with Normal prices in both 
the short and long periods, and conflates this process of convergence through 
time with the determination of Normal prices as equilibrium prices. Keynes 
accepts for theoretical purposes that market prices tend to converge towards 
Normal prices; but he changes the definition of the equilibrium periods in 
terms of calendar time, as well as the concept of a stationary or steady state 
that is necessary for this process of convergence also to generate Normal 
values as equilibrium prices. While Marshall’s stationary or steady state 
refers to a physical allocation of resources, Keynes will allow only a given 
state of expectation that is independent of the physical parameters. 
Furthermore, Keynes makes an important distinction between short-term 
expectation, which governs the level of production and employment, and 
long-term expectation, which governs the investment decision. 
Walrasian general equilibrium theory denotes as a ‘temporary’ 
equilibrium (not to be confused with Marshall’s usage, to mean market-
period equilibrium) an equilibrium based on expectations rather than 
complete markets. In terms of realism, this is an improvement over the 
complete markets assumption, since it limits knowledge to the present 
configuration of endowment, technology and preferences, all of which are 
open to change. Today’s temporary equilibrium may be superseded 
tomorrow, given change in the parameters. However no distinction is made in 
Walrasian models between short- and long-term expectation, between on the 
one hand, expectations of the prices of goods producible today and on the 
other, expectations of the future goods producible in turn with the capital-
goods producible today. This amounts to making the state of expectation 
endogenous and postulating some nexus (G.T. p. 21) that co-ordinates 
expectations in such a way as to ensure full employment of the endowment.  
Post Keynesian theorists have placed great emphasis on the state of long-
term expectation and this will be addressed in the next section. However, the 
consensus interpretation of the state of short-term expectation, stemming 
mainly from Kregel (1976), needs revision. It has become common to assert 
that Keynes tacitly assumes the fulfilment of short-term expectations in G.T. 
Chapter 3. By this assumption, it is argued, he avoids the need to model the 
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formation of expectations as a process over time. On the contrary, there is no 
need to read in extra assumptions and implicitly disparage Keynes’s capacity 
for theoretical reasoning. The principle of effective demand is itself a theory 
of the formation of short-term price expectations by the equilibrium of supply 
and demand. 
In order to substantiate this claim, first consider again Keynes’s 
conception of system equilibrium. He offers a theory of the level of 
employment at any time as an equilibrium value. His method of equilibrium 
analysis is static, but forward-looking. The analytical framework is a direct 
extension of Marshall’s supply and demand apparatus for use at the 
macroeconomic level. The aggregate demand function (D) relates the total 
money-income expected by industry as a whole to the total level of 
employment (N), where the direction of causation runs from employment to 
income. The aggregate supply function (Z) relates the total expected money-
income to the total level of employment (N), where the direction of causation 
runs from expected income to employment. The intersection of the aggregate 
demand and supply functions determines as equilibrium values the effective 
demand (let us call it D*) and the level of employment (let us call it N*). 
The principle of effective demand is part of the theory of value and, in 
moving from the consideration of the individual industry to industry as a 
whole, there is no suggestion by Keynes that supply and demand have ceased 
to determine the prices and quantities of each product. Apart from 
improvements such as the introduction of user cost to deal with the element 
of supply price attributable to the use of existing capital-goods, Keynes’s 
theory of value remains essentially that of Marshall and Pigou. However, the 
principle of effective demand solves the problem that supply and demand in 
each industry depend on the output and income of industry as a whole, and 
brings precision to Marshall’s claim that short-period and long-period 
expected prices, and not only the spot prices of the market period, can 
realistically be treated as determined by the equilibrium of supply and 
demand. 
There are major difficulties with Marshall’s treatment of time and his 
theoretical distinction between periods, which Keynes refers to in his 
biography of Marshall (C.W. X) as unfinished business and takes pains to 
address in The General Theory. The principal difficulty resolved by Keynes 
is how the equilibrium periods should relate to real or calendar time. In The 
General Theory, both the market and short periods correspond to the same 
period of calendar time, the ‘day’. Whereas Marshall distinguishes between 
them in terms of the length of time (‘several months or a year’) over which 
production and employment can adjust so that market prices become equal to 
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normal short-period supply prices, for Keynes the difference between the 
market and the short periods is that between realised and expected prices: 
between income and effective demand. 
The production and employment decision involves two separate units of 
calendar time, which Keynes defines as the day and the period of production, 
which is a number of days. The day is Keynes’s quantum unit of time, ‘the 
shortest interval after which the firm is free to revise its decision as to how 
much employment to offer. It is, so to speak, the minimum effective unit of 
economic time’ (G.T. p. 47, n1); the primary concern of The General Theory 
is the employment decisions of firms. This definition of a day is also the 
definition of the technical short period, in which entrepreneurs adjust the 
aggregate employment of labour associated with a given aggregate capital 
equipment to maximise their expected profits. The correspondence of the day 
with the market period again follows from the definition of the day, since it is 
the maximum interval for which the supply of finished output is limited to 
the stock on hand or producible on demand. Keynes’s day need not 
correspond to a terrestrial day, but it does no harm to think of it as such, if 
only because the hours of over-time working can be, and often are, varied at 
such short notice. The period of production is the number of days ‘notice of 
changes in the demand for [a product that] have to be given if it is to offer its 
maximum elasticity of employment’ (G.T. p. 287). This definition is the 
macroeconomic counterpart of the period between starting and finishing an 
individual production process (G.T. p. 46), or production period.4  
Keynes defines the long period in a unique and strictly short-term 
technical sense, to define the equilibrium on which the employment of labour 
and capital-goods will in theory converge if a new state of expectation 
persists for the full length of the period of production, allowing in particular 
for the production or depletion of raw materials and work-in-progress in line 
with the new pattern of production. This is very different from Marshall’s 
concept of the long period (‘of several years’), during which capital-goods 
are accumulated to the point where no new capital-good (and not only the 
marginal investment on a given day) yields more than the rate of interest, in a 
stationary state (or at least in a steady state of growth in line with secular 
growth in population and territory). 
It is perhaps helpful to follow Joan Robinson in thinking of the terms 
market-period, short-period and long-period mainly as adjectives rather than 
substantives (Harcourt, 1995). That is not to deny the importance of their 
connection with intervals of calendar time. Each equilibrium period refers to 
a different type of adjustment: the market period mainly to market clearing, 
and income; the short period to the employment of labour and the other 
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factors of production (including existing capital-goods), and effective 
demand; the long period to the employment of new capital goods, and the 
capital stock. Thus we need to distinguish the nature of the adjustment from 
the interval of time in which it takes place, as well as from the time horizon 
of the relevant expectations which prompt adjustment. The market-period 
adjustment of the demand for and supply of current output and existing 
stocks takes place ‘instantaneously’, on a single day, cleared by spot market 
prices – this is fairly standard. The short-period adjustment of employment 
also takes place on a single day but refers to short-term expectations of 
income that will arise at the end of the various production periods for 
different goods. The long-period adjustment of the capital stock takes place 
as a dynamic process over the period of production, and is contingent upon a 
given state of expectation. 
 Many have been puzzled by the definition of aggregate demand as ‘the 
proceeds which entrepreneurs expect to receive from the employment’ (G.T. 
p. 25, emphasis added see also G.T. pp. 28–9, 89), rather than in terms of the 
expenditure of consumers and investors, the aggregate demand of 
‘Keynesian’ economics. Yet this paradox is already implicit in Marshall’s 
claim that Normal prices, which are prices expected by entrepreneurs today, 
are determined by the equilibrium of supply and demand. The answer is that 
Keynes’s entrepreneurs must be understood as fulfilling two separate 
functions on either side of the market, as employers of labour on the one 
hand, and as wholesale and retail dealers on the other (see Marshall 1920, 
p. 283; C.W. XIII, p. 616). Employers are specialised in managing the risks 
of production, and dealers in managing the risks of marketing finished goods; 
a division of enterprise commonly observed in practice. In this construction, 
production takes place when an employer receives an order, usually from a 
dealer or another employer. Production to order implies, under perfect 
competition, the existence of a set of forward markets, for each good that is 
producible today, for delivery at the end of its production period. 
Competition between employers establishes a unique supply price for any 
given quantity, and competition between dealers, whatever their individual 
expectations about future spot prices, establishes a demand-price at which 
each dealer’s demand is in equilibrium. If any speculation about future spot 
prices by employers is treated as a dealer activity, the equilibrium forward 
prices of current output become shared short-term expectations, which 
permits unique definition of ‘the’ state of expectation.5 
The point of effective demand is a short-period equilibrium position, 
meaning that entrepreneurs as a whole adjust their employment of labour to 
maximise their expected profit with a given aggregate stock of capital-goods. 
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Since Keynes’s short period relates to his day, and the day is the quantum 
unit of time, this means that aggregate demand and supply are in static 
equilibrium at all times (every day); the equilibrium process of finding the 
point of effective demand described at G.T. p. 25 takes place on a single day, 
the present day. The equilibrium price of the output of each industry 
corresponding to today’s aggregate employment is determined today as the 
price which clears the supply offers by employers and the demand bids by 
dealers in the forward market for delivery at the end of the production period. 
Each day employment moves directly to the equilibrium position 
corresponding to the set of forward prices, so that within the quantum limit of 
the day as the unit of time, employment is in continuous equilibrium. 
The set of equilibrium expected prices that determines effective demand 
corresponds to the state of short-term expectation (G.T. p. 46), so that it can 
properly be said that expectation determines output and employment, the title 
of G.T. Chapter 5. In modern terms, Keynes’s short-term expectations are 
‘rational expectations’, or in his own words, based on ‘judicious foresight’. 
Although he recognises that in practice expectations may be formed by trial 
and error, from the perspective of economic theory ‘the main point is to 
distinguish the forces determining the position of equilibrium from the 
technique of trial and error by means of which the entrepreneur discovers 
where the position is’ (C.W. XIV, pp. 182–3). 
By contrast, the state of long-term expectation is an entirely different 
matter. Keynes does not assume long-term expectations are fulfilled even in 
his long-period equilibrium (where they are merely unchanged), and indeed 
considers disappointment more than likely when expectations are not based 
on the rents of natural resources or monopoly. The problem is the durable 
nature of capital-assets: if the expectations upon which the investment was 
based prove mistaken, it is not possible, either to reverse the investment 
today, or to go back in time, adjust the original investment decision, and then 
check the revised results in the present, in order to find the equilibrium 
position. It is only in a stationary or steady state that adjustments made today 
might (given stable dynamics) be expected to have the same effect in the 
future as the same adjustments, made in the past, would have had today. So, 
the convergent feedback mechanism, which would be necessary to generate 
in practice a set of long-term equilibrium prices as the basis of prospective 
yield, is absent in any economy subject to unforeseen change, such as the one 
we inhabit. The period over which competitive equilibrium analysis is of 
scientific value relates directly to the time horizon within which expectations 
can reasonably be treated as determinate. The method cannot be applied to 
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the long term, thus wholly undermining the Classical concept of long-period 
competitive equilibrium, whether static or dynamic.6  
To assume ‘rational expectations’ in the long term is heroically to assume 
a very unheroic world, in which the future can reliably be predicted from 
knowledge of the present and the past. The state of long-term expectation is 
as exogenous in The General Theory as the endowment and other Classical 
system parameters, meaning that it is beyond the reach of equilibrium 
analysis. It is a close cousin to the propensity to consume and the preference 
for liquidity, both of which also reflect the historical nature of time. These 
three psychological states represent rational (by which here I mean 
reasonable, not optimal in some objective sense) responses by purposeful 
individuals to the problems of time, in the real world where the Classical 
long-period equilibrium is logically unattainable, and therefore an objectively 
optimal response is physically impossible. 
LIQUIDITY 
Much has already been written by Post Keynesian economists about the state 
of long-term expectation, including the notion of conventional valuation 
represented by the famous beauty contest of G.T. Chapter 12. The 
inescapable fact that there is no such thing as ‘fundamental value’ (except 
with hindsight) has been driven home forcibly by recent events. Yet less 
attention has been given to what Keynes means by ‘liquidity’ and indeed 
most Post Keynesians accept the common understanding of liquidity as ease 
of conversion into money. Most have missed that Keynes wrote about 
something quite different, perhaps encouraged, once again, by Hansen’s 
statement that ‘not much would have been lost if [G.T. Chapter 17] had never 
been written’ (1953, p. 159). 
Keynes distinguishes between the attributes of convertibility and liquidity; 
there is more to his conception of liquidity than convertibility. In principle, 
an asset with low convertibility may have high liquidity, and vice versa, 
however counter-intuitive this may now seem. Liquidity is intimately related 
with expectation in The General Theory, and its meaning is fundamental to 
the understanding of the book as a whole. Kaldor notes that  
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Mr Keynes, in certain parts of The General Theory appears to use the term 
‘liquidity’ in a sense which comes very close to our concept of ‘perfect 
marketability’; ie goods which can be sold at any time for the same price, or nearly 
the same price, at which they can be bought. Yet it is obvious that this attribute of 
goods is not the same thing as what Mr Keynes really wants to mean by ‘liquidity’. 
Certain gilt-edged securities can be bought on the Stock Exchange at a price which 
is only a small fraction higher than the price at which they can be sold; on this 
definition therefore they would have to be regarded as highly liquid assets. In fact 
it is very difficult to find satisfactory definition of what constitutes ‘liquidity’ – a 
difficulty, I think, which is inherent in the concept itself. (Kaldor, 1939, p. 4, n5) 
The paradox of The General Theory is that Keynes so emphasises the 
liquidity of money within a theoretical framework, based on perfect 
competition, in which all assets are equally marketable or convertible. Why 
does he then discuss degrees of liquidity (G.T. p. 226) and, furthermore, 
suggest that in certain historic environments land has ‘ruled the roost’ in the 
hierarchy of liquidity (G.T. p. 241)? If the assumption of perfect competition 
is to be qualified in practice so that differences in the liquidity of assets are 
allowed, as a function of their degree of convertibility, this suggestion is 
startling. Land can never have been preferred for its convertibility, let alone 
as the medium of exchange. Keynes claims that historically it has possessed 
high liquidity, despite low convertibility. Conversely, in his discussion of 
organised investment markets, which come closest in practice to the ideal of 
perfect competition in terms of transaction costs and uniformity of price, he 
treats their ‘liquidity’ (note the inverted commas) as an illusion and 
something distinct from true liquidity. Listed equity securities have high 
convertibility, but low liquidity. 
Keynes’s implicit definition of liquidity is the degree to which the value of 
an asset, measured in any given standard, is independent of changes in the 
state of expectation. Liquidity risk is therefore the possible (not probable or 
expected) loss of value as a result of a change in the state of expectation, 
which includes the state of confidence. In The General Theory, there is a 
hierarchy of liquidity risk, in which bonds are superior to capital-goods, and 
money is superior to bonds. This hierarchy is of crucial importance to 
Keynes’s division between consumption and different types of investment 
decisions, which later theory has neglected. Keynes’s conception of liquidity 
is intimately bound up with his conceptions of the state of expectation and of 
the historical nature of time. Liquidity has value only because the future is 
unknown, and its value increases with our fear of what might happen that we 
cannot prevent or insure against. In The General Theory, money is the liquid 
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asset and dominant store of value, as well as the standard of value, and 
money’s liquidity is the foundation of its non-neutrality. 
Keynes comes closest to defining liquidity from first principles in his 
discussion of a situation where the standard of value (perhaps the goat to 
which he refers in A Treatise on Money, C.W. V, but certainly not land) does 
not have the normal character of money: 
In [a non-monetary] economy capital equipments will differ from one another (a) 
in the variety of the consumables in the production of which they are capable of 
assisting, (b) in the stability of value of their output (in the sense in which the 
value of bread is more stable through time than the value of fashionable novelties), 
and (c) in the rapidity with which the wealth embodied in them can become 
‘liquid’, in the sense of producing output, the proceeds of which can be re-
embodied if desired in quite a different form. (G.T. p. 240) 
Liquidity is firstly a function of the degree to which a capital-asset can be 
used in the production of different consumables, so that a change in 
prospective yield based on production in one line can be met by switching to 
another line. The prospective yield on the second line is lower than originally 
expected from the first, but higher than now expected from the first after the 
change in expectations, reducing the impact of the change on the value of the 
asset. Keynes then refers to the importance of the stability of the value of the 
consumables produced. Stability in this context means independence from 
changes in the state of long-term expectation (e.g. bread is not a fashion 
item). The third element of his definition is the ‘turnover period’, the period 
over which the asset can be converted through production into consumable 
output. The shorter the period, the less likely is it that a change in the state of 
long-term expectation will arise during the life of the asset. Clearly Keynes is 
here thinking in aggregate terms: although an individual investor can always 
exchange an asset for money under perfect competition, its convertibility for 
the community as a whole depends on its conversion into consumption-goods 
through production and not just exchange.  
For the various rather complex reasons set out in G.T. Chapter 17, the 
standard of value tends to be the asset whose value in terms of consumable 
output is the most stable with respect to changes in the state of long-term 
expectation. Thus when Keynes refers to liquidity he really does mean 
money, including short-term bank and state debts whose value is not sensitive 
to changes in the rate of interest because of the short period to redemption. 
Keynes treats capital-assets as fully convertible but not liquid, and mentions, 
almost as a footnote to the above definition (G.T. p. 240), the need for a 
premium to compensate for their liquidity risk relative to bonds. The rate of 
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interest on bonds, where there is no ‘risk proper’, is entirely compensation for 
liquidity risk from unexpected changes in interest rates. From this it is clear 
that Keynes regards capital-assets as less liquid than bonds, in the sense that 
their value is more sensitive to changes in the state of long-term expectation, 
since the value of capital-assets depends on expectations of both the interest 
rate and the prospective yield. On this definition of liquidity, money and 
bonds dominate capital-assets in terms of both ‘risk proper’ and liquidity risk. 
The first step in the portfolio decision is to choose between money and the 
next most liquid and safe class of assets, i.e. bonds; only then does the choice 
arise between capital-assets and bonds. Thus liquidity risk is the criterion for 
placing different categories of asset in separate compartments, and the 
demand for liquidity cannot be satisfied by assets other than money (i.e. the 
set of assets convertible on demand into means of payment at a fixed price in 
terms of the standard of value). 
This ‘hierarchy of liquidity’ is central to the causal structure of The 
General Theory that Keynes describes in his 1937 summary. Stage 1: ‘The 
rate of interest is the factor which adjusts at the margin the demand for 
hoards to the supply of hoards’. Stage 2: ‘The owner of wealth, who has been 
induced not to hold his wealth in the shape of hoarded money, still has two 
alternatives between which to choose. He can lend his money at the current 
rate of money interest or he can purchase some kind of capital asset ... This is 
brought about by shifts in the money prices of capital assets relative to the 
prices of money loans’: so bonds (money loans) dominate capital assets. 
Stage 3: ‘If the level of the rate of interest taken in conjunction with opinions 
about their prospective yield raise the prices of capital assets, the volume of 
current investment … will be increased’: thus the supply price and output of 
new capital assets rises to meet the demand price. Stage 4: ‘The amount of 
consumption goods it will pay entrepreneurs to produce depends on the 
amount of investment goods which they are producing’: investment 
determines total employment and consumption through the multiplier 
relation. ‘This that I offer is, therefore, a theory of … employment because it 
explains why, in any given circumstances, employment is what it is’ (C.W. 
XIV pp. 112–122). 
It is of the greatest importance to realise that in The General Theory 
individuals do not choose between (say) consumption-goods on the one hand 
and bonds or capital-assets on the other (Fisher and Hicks); nor between 
money and consumption-goods (Pigou and Friedman), or even money and 
capital-assets (Minsky). Keynes does not accept the Classical axiom of gross 
substitution, he insists upon a causal sequence: first, liquidity-preference 
must be satisfied and the prices of bonds adjust in response; secondly, the 
16 Keynes’ The General Theory : Seventy-Five Years Later 
prices of capital assets must adjust to the prices of bonds. Finally aggregate 
income, employment and consumption adjust to the rate of investment in new 
capital assets. Without a clear understanding of liquidity, Keynes’s one-way 
causal sequence appears arbitrary and inferior to a treatment in which direct 
trade-offs exist between all classes of goods and factor services. 
RELEVANCE TO POLICY 
After a long period in the wilderness, Keynes is back in fashion. ‘Keynesian’ 
demand management policies made an overnight resurgence in response to 
the 2008 financial crisis and government deficits have been running at levels 
unprecedented in peace-time. Nevertheless, just as Keynes’s impact on 
academic economic theory has been minimal, three examples will suffice to 
show that key policy areas remain largely immune to his influence. 
Recent developments have so far left intact the doctrine of so-called 
‘flexible labour markets’ as the remedy for unemployment. Underpinning this 
is the theoretical concept of the ‘natural rate’ of unemployment, which 
corresponds to the rate consistent with frictional and voluntary 
unemployment (on Keynes’s definitions in G.T. Chapter 2). These are 
matters of great importance, of course, and of particular relevance to 
productivity growth and social welfare. There is much to be said for policies 
that make it easier for workers to retrain and move between occupations and 
industries as the pattern of demand changes. Equally, it is important that 
employment and welfare policies do not create perverse incentives, 
preventing a rational reallocation of labour in the long-term interests of both 
workers and the economy as a whole. However the flexible labour market is 
often simply a euphemism for an attack on organised labour, employment 
protection rights and welfare benefits. Leaving aside the partisan motives of 
the business class, the public interest case for such policies is based on the 
Classical theory of employment and 
‘the conclusion, perfectly logical on their assumption, that apparent unemployment 
(apart from the admitted exceptions) must be due at bottom to a refusal by the 
unemployed factors to accept a reward which corresponds to their marginal 
productivity. A classical economist may sympathise with labour in refusing to 
accept a cut in its money wage, and he will admit that it may not be wise to make 
it to meet conditions which are temporary; but scientific integrity forces him to 
declare that this refusal is, nevertheless, at the bottom of the trouble.’ (G.T. p. 16) 
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Thus the doctrine of flexible labour markets, in the form in which it is 
generally promoted, wholly ignores Keynes’s careful demonstration that it is 
the level of employment which determines the real cost of labour and that not 
only does the opposite not hold, the real cost of labour is not a causal variable 
and certainly not proxied by money wages or benefits. Wide movements in 
the ‘natural rate’ are interpreted as having their roots in shifts in productivity 
or labour practices, based on a partial reading of the empirical evidence 
(Galbraith, 1997; Nickell, 1997), and no credence is given to the idea that 
these variations in the unemployment rate reflect, in great part, movements in 
the level of effective demand. 
The second area of policy is the reform of the international trading and 
monetary system. Although Keynes is often given credit for the Bretton 
Woods system, the institutions which emerged were a pale imitation of his 
own proposals and were empowered and have survived only insofar as they 
have served the interests of Anglo-American hegemony. The downfall of the 
pegged exchange rate system and the end of ‘Keynesian’ demand 
management in the 1970s coincided with the counter-reformation in 
economic theory and was followed by the era of financial liberalisation. Yet 
even during the ‘Keynesian’ era, policy-makers failed to distinguish between 
aggregate and effective demand and sought to maintain full employment by 
demand management with insufficient attention to the need for demand to 
become effective, ie matched by supply. The most important aspect of this is 
the balance of payments constraint on employment and growth which 
plagued countries, such as the UK under Bretton Woods, that tended towards 
full-employment trade deficits. Keynes had offered two alternative 
approaches to this problem: managed trade and surplus country adjustment. 
The idea of managed trade was anathema and the idea that payments and 
exchange rate adjustment should fall on surplus countries, as embodied in 
Keynes’s original plans for an International Clearing Union, has always been 
opposed by large surplus countries (the US in the 1940s, West Germany and 
Japan in the later 1960s and early 1970s, China today). Since in political 
terms it is these surplus countries that determine the outcome in negotiations 
over the international monetary system, it is unsurprising that no progress has 
been made. 
So we find that global demand is still constrained by an excessive 
propensity to save, in the form of trade and payments surpluses intended to 
promote domestic employment, combined with a propensity to hoard in the 
form of central bank reserves to protect exchange rates from the depredations 
of international speculation. The era of ‘financial liberalisation’ sold an 
image of smoothly adjusting capital and foreign exchange markets allocating 
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capital efficiently across the globe, diversifying risk, promoting stability and 
freedom. The reality has been a massive loss of democratic sovereignty over 
domestic policy, forcing states either into monetary union or into amassing 
war chests against the next financial crisis. The natural linkage between 
monetary and political union, perhaps desirable in itself, combined with an 
inability to regulate an independent exchange rate, has forced states into 
premature membership of the European Union and the euro-zone. The Union 
has been enlarged hastily, without putting in place an adequate political or 
fiscal mechanism for dealing with intra-union regional imbalances, placing 
severe strains on peripheral countries that may yet break the union and in any 
case quite likely to leave generations of unemployed in the poorer regions. 
The choice faced by Keynes, between the fetters of the Gold Standard and the 
anarchy of the inter-war period, remains before us still, in a new form, and 
the world remains deaf to pleas for a more rational way of organising the 
international financial system. 
One of the fundamental obstacles to the reform of international finance 
has been financial liberalisation itself, particularly the free movement of 
financial capital across borders. Keynes correctly understood such capital 
movements to be incompatible with an orderly exchange rate system and the 
world has chosen ‘freedom’ over order. The removal of cross-border 
exchange controls on portfolio investment were among the first fruits of 
liberalisation and have been followed down the years by a change in the 
nature of the regulation of financial institutions from a ‘structural’ to a 
‘prudential’ approach. Structural regulation makes a link between form and 
activity, defining different types of financial institution and limiting each to a 
particular kind of activity and creating ‘fire-walls’ between them: the Glass-
Steagall Act is an example. Structural regulation conflicts with the 
competitive ethos of liberalization and fire-walls appear to the liberalizer 
simply as obstacles to competion and enterprise. Prudential regulation, by 
contrast, is intended to allow integrated financial institutions the freedom to 
pursue any activity provided they meet various conditions, notably capital 
adequacy. While the intention of the new approach was to promote 
competition and innovation at the same time as protecting the system from 
risk, regulators have proved no match for the larger financial institutions and 
have imposed an increasingly oppressive compliance burden on smaller ones, 
while the Basle II regime itself has proved pro-cyclical and destabilizing. The 
implicit acceptance by the state of responsibility for the effectiveness of this 
kind of regulation has led to the almost universal government guarantee of 
retail deposits in the face of the failure of the regulatory system in 2008. It 
 Keynes, the Neglected Theorist 19 
has not escaped public notice that bank shareholders and managers have 
thereby succeeded in transferring the cost of their failure to the state. 
As in the case of unemployment and the ‘natural rate’, underpinning 
financial liberalisation is another theoretical concept, the ‘efficient markets 
hypothesis’. Based in turn on the concept of long-term rational expectations, 
this is another example of the refusal of policy-makers to accept the core 
implications of Keynes’s thought. Keynes would, I think, have been horrified 
by financial liberalisation and by the blind faith of policy-makers and 
regulators in the stabilising ability of speculative market forces to identify 
fundamental value. The failure to recognise that there is no such thing as 
fundamental value (except with hindsight) has left policy-makers wide open 
to the larger failure to recognise the destabilising power of speculation when: 
‘the energies and skill of the professional investor and speculator are mainly 
occupied … not with making superior long-term forecasts of the probable yield of 
an investment over its whole life, but with foreseeing changes in the conventional 
basis of valuation a short time ahead of the general public … Moreover, this 
behaviour is not the outcome of a wrong-headed propensity. It is an inevitable 
result of an investment market organised along the lines described’ (G.T. pp. 154–
155). 
Furthermore the financial sector has long lost touch with its primary social 
justification as a source of finance for industrial investment, i.e. the 
production of new capital-goods. It is a commonplace in the City of London 
that the City does not exist to finance industry, industry exists to finance the 
City. The hypertrophy of financial instruments over the last decade, fuelled 
by sophisticated, if theoretically ill-founded, mathematical alchemy and 
computer technology, converting some underlying piece of lead into gold, 
exemplifies the elevation of rentier capitalism to an end in itself and has met 
its Nemesis in the failures of Lehman Brothers and AIG. 
The credit crunch itself has been an object lesson in the importance of 
liquidity preference. With a significant proportion of bank depositors 
switching to foreign banks or sovereign debt, UK and US banks themselves 
became reluctant to lend to each other in order to protect their dwindling 
reserve assets. Each bank was torn between the need to hoard reserves 
against the possibility of a run and the high cost of doing so. Keynes’s 
definition of money became strikingly relevant: 
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Without disturbance to this definition, we can draw the line between “money” and 
“debts” at whatever point is most convenient for handling a particular problem. 
For example, we can treat as money any command over general purchasing power 
which the owner has not parted with for a period in excess of three months, and as 
debt what cannot be recovered for a longer period than this; or we can substitute 
for “three months” one month or three days or three hours or any other period; or 
we can exclude from money whatever is not legal tender on the spot. (G.T. p. 167, 
n. 1) 
At the height of the crunch, ‘money’ moved right to the end of this spectrum, 
as exemplified by the unparalled spread of inter-bank interest rates over 
central bank rates (e.g. Bank of England, 2009, p. 15). The emergency 
measures (such as guarantees of inter-bank lending, extended discount 
facilities and quantitative easing) were successful, not because they addressed 
long-term bank solvency in the sense of capital adequacy, i.e. the probability 
of loss (which had been addressed separately), but because they removed the 
possibility of default on short-term inter-bank deposits through further bank 
runs. Keynes’s theory of interest was mainly concerned with interest rates on 
long-term bonds, since fundamental uncertainty about the spot value of debts 
is normally a property of long time horizons, yet during the period of the 
financial crisis, the reality of liquidity preference became searingly clear, 
even at the short end.  
Yet still, after all we have been through, the conventional wisdom remains 
that interest rates are determined by the supply and demand for loanable 
funds and the case for cutting public deficits is partly that an increase in 
national saving will reduce interest rates: 
Shadow Chancellor George Osborne rightly believes cutting spending allows 
interest rates to remain lower than they would otherwise be. Indeed, this is what 
textbook macroeconomic models suggest. The Bank of England believes much the 
same. (Financial Times, 2010) 
In darker moments, one is inclined to fear that the conventional wisdom, 
together with the mainstream macroeconomic theory from which it derives, is 
impervious to reason or experience. 
CONCLUSION 
I have argued that Keynes’s direct influence on economic theory and policy 
has so far been minimal. This, perhaps surprising, conclusion does not 
discount the importance of the policies of demand management associated 
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with his name, it merely emphasises that he gave cogency, respectability and 
authority to policies advocated by many others. Nevertheless, while such a 
conclusion may be disappointing in relation to the hopes that were 
entertained 75 years ago, it is actually cause for considerable hope for the 
future. Economic policy is ultimately rooted in economic theory, consciously 
or not. The first attempts to articulate the Keynesian revolution in theory 
have failed. In the case of the ‘Keynesian’ neoclassical synthesis, Keynes’s 
distinctive innovations were rejected so that his message could be assimilated 
into the mainstream of economics as the economics of rigidity, now 
represented by a ‘New Keynesian’ economics that should really be called 
‘New Pigovian’ economics. The Post Keynesians, for the most part, rejected 
Keynes’s Marshallian framework as an attempt to pour new wine into old 
wineskins and many have moved outside the mainstream of economic theory 
based on the competitive equilibrium of supply and demand. Keynes himself, 
by contrast, sought to redefine the very mainstream itself. 
The research programme initiated by Keynes has not failed or 
degenerated, it has barely begun.  The history of science suggests that it can 
take several generations of academic scholarship for truly original ideas to be 
received. Scientific progress involves many wrong turns and dead ends. I 
have tried here to show that future theoretical research must start from three 
key propositions about The General Theory: 
 
• A valid macroeconomic theory of a competitive monetary economy 
cannot begin from the assumption of homogeneous output. Competitive 
corn models are ineluctably Classical. Production in a monetary 
economy involves the hiring of labour by the payment of a money-wage. 
The principle of effective demand represents accordingly the conception 
of competitive system equilibrium relevant to a monetary economy and 
supersedes the Classical conception of general equilibrium as the 
preferred allocation of factor resources. This invariably means that factor 
markets do not clear and factor prices are not equilibrium values. 
• The principle of effective demand is itself a theory of the formation of 
the state of short-term expectation (which determines employment at any 
time) by the equilibrium of supply and demand. In short, it is a 
restatement of the Marshallian theory of value so as to take proper 
account of time and money. The concept of what we now call ‘rational 
expectations’ was well understood by Keynes under the name of 
‘judicious foresight’. The key distinction he drew was between short-
term expectation, relating to currently producible goods, and long-term 
expectation, relating to the investment decision. While the method of 
22 Keynes’ The General Theory : Seventy-Five Years Later 
rational expectations can validly be applied to the short term, the long 
term is an entirely different matter. 
• The causal structure of The General Theory cannot be understood 
without the recognition that liquidity for Keynes is far more than a 
matter of convertibility and is intimately related with the state of 
expectation. Liquidity means for Keynes stability of value in the face of 
changes in the state of expectation, so that in certain circumstances an 
asset such as land can be a liquid asset and stock market securities are 
generally illiquid for society as a whole. 
 
As for policy, the doctrines of labour market flexibility and efficient markets 
have their roots in Classical theory. The former leads to cruel and futile 
attempts to remedy involuntary unemployment by creating insecurity and 
poverty through cuts in employment rights and benefits. The fruits of the 
efficient markets hypothesis have been a financial crisis of unprecedented 
scale and a plunge in global activity which has, perhaps, been countered only 
by the single-minded application of ‘Keynesian’ demand management 
policies in the teeth of an academic orthodoxy that largely denies their 
potency. Finally, we are unlikely ever to see a world of human flourishing, 
free from the scourge of involuntary underemployment, without radical 
reform of the international monetary system in the teeth of an economic and 
political ideology committed to financial liberalisation. Such reform will only 
become conceivable if and when the intellectual substrate of the conventional 
wisdom finally comes to terms with the message of The General Theory. 
NOTES 
1. There is also a clear connection between corn models and the under-consumption (i.e. 
over-production) theories of Malthus, Marx and Hobson, who noted, in effect, that there 
must be a limit to the accumulation in granaries. 
2. This is not to deny that the concept of effective demand can be expressed in quite different 
terms such as Kalecki’s or Sraffa’s, by introducing an exogenous mark-up over average 
cost. In these alternative constructions, prices are not determined by supply and demand. 
For an explanation of the difference between the degree of monopoly and Keynes’s degree 
of competition see Hayes (2008). 
3. The ‘fixed-price general equilibrium’ approach introduces a similar over-determining 
constraint on employment of the endowment. The difference is that Keynes’s own concept 
of effective demand retains market-clearing in new goods markets with factor demand as a 
residual (see Malinvaud, 1985, p.31, footnote 28). The problem is that ‘in the long run’, if 
prices are flexible, Malinvaud’s conception of equilibrium reverts to the Classical. 
4. The consensus about Keynes’s use of time periods, from which I depart, is that Keynes’s 
day and production period coincide, and correspond to a Hicksian week (Chick, 1983; 
Amadeo, 1989), an equation which tacitly assumes a uniform production period for all 
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goods. Daily employment thus differs, for these authors, from the short-period employment 
equilibrium in which expectations are fulfilled.  
5. Chick (1983, 1992) offers perhaps the most sophisticated development of the received idea 
that the equilibrium point of effective demand is discovered by the fulfilment of 
expectations. She distinguishes between De, aggregate demand in terms of entrepreneurial 
expectations (which may be entirely individual to each firm, and thus does not permit 
definition of a unique and common state of expectation), and D, meaning aggregate 
demand in terms of expenditure. The point of effective demand is then defined by the 
intersection of Z and De, but equilibrium is not reached in terms of fulfilled expectations 
until (if ever) De coincides with D. A difficulty with her interpretation is that it leaves no 
room for Keynes’s long-period employment, which various other authors have also found 
problematic. 
6. Harrod did not accept that our ignorance of the future made long-term equilibrium theory 
pointless and regarded the absence of dynamic equilibrium from The General Theory as a 
weakness. He envisaged (and subsequently contributed to) the development of a theory 
‘concerned not merely with what size, but also what rate of growth of certain magnitudes is 
consistent with the surrounding circumstances. There appears to be no reason why the 
dynamic principles should not come to be as precisely defined and as rigidly demonstrable 
as the static principles’ (1937, p. 86). This is also the view ultimately embodied in modern 
Classical dynamic general equilibrium theory based upon the concept of long-term long-
period equilibrium that Keynes fundamentally rejected. Theories of accumulation and 
technical change are possible but they should not be based on competitive equilibrium. 
 
